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Absolute Auctions typically get the most bidding. For the seller, the risk associated with an Absolute Auction is greater than the other types of auctions, but so is the potential reward.
Thus, the optimal information structure is to reveal the value of all those bidders who have a value lower than some threshold determined by a fixed quantile qN and otherwise reveal no information beyond the fact that the value is above the thresh- old.
Then, the optimal strategy for bidder 1 is to bid the expected highest value of all remaining potential buyers, conditioned on the event that this value is less than the value of bidder 1, simply taking account the probability of various numbers of bidders.
0:00 14:17 The Ideal Auction - Numberphile - YouTube YouTube Start of suggested clip End of suggested clip Came from two increase and youre kind of standard auction. Says were going to let competition pushMoreCame from two increase and youre kind of standard auction. Says were going to let competition push the price. Up. And until one person is left standing.
Auction Fever and the Endowment Effect This principle basically means that when you feel an attachment or sense of ownership with an item, like you may for the brief moment that your bid is in the lead, you subconsciously value that item more and can be willing to bid a higher price than you originally intended.
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The auction that maximizes the sellers expected revenue subject. to (ex post, interim) individual rationality and Bayesian incentive. compatibility for the buyers is an optimal auction.
Vickrey showed that, if a seller has a single indivisible good for sale, a second-price auction (see Section 2) is an efficient mechanismi.e., the winner is the buyer whose valuation of the good is highestin the case where buyers have private values (private values mean that no buyers private information affects
Then, the optimal strategy for bidder 1 is to bid the expected highest value of all remaining potential buyers, conditioned on the event that this value is less than the value of bidder 1, simply taking account the probability of various numbers of bidders.

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